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APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent Scandit, Inc. (“Scandit”) fails to give any reason to sustain the District 
Judge’s granting of Scandit’s Motion to Dismiss.  Scandit misstates the factual record by 
implying that the word “prepaid” modifies the duty to pay 100% of the commission upon 
booking and by claiming that the commission contract requires payment from the customer to be 
received prior to 100% of the respective commission being due.  Scandit 
• ignores the plain mean of the Idaho Statute that defines “commissions” as a form 
of “wages”;  
• attempts to overlay California and other cases that lack a statutory definition of 
“commissions” as “wages” unlike Idaho statutory law and thus engages in 
unnecessary wrangling over whether this commission under Idaho is a wage 
(clearly it is); 
• ignores Idaho wage claim statutory law that speaks in terms of the amount “due” 
or “due and owing” as the key event justifying a wage claim in favor of a pinched 
and narrow contractual definition of “earned” (describing recoupment or claw-
back, types of forfeitures in the nature of a condition subsequent); 
•  fails to explain why the condition precedent/condition subsequent (forfeiture) 
common law analysis should not apply to determine when a commission wage is 
“due” or “due and owing” under the Idaho Wage Claim Act statutes; and 
• ignores language of the contract that plainly says the commission here was to be 
paid, i.e., was “due” or “due and owing”, upon booking of revenue from the sale. 
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Further, a recent decision of this Court on December 21, 2017, Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor 
Media, LLC, No. 44416, 2017 WL 6521897, at *4 (not released for publication in the Permanent 
Law Reports) while this case was pending on appeal concerns pattern and practice and course of 
performance as amending the parties’ compensation agreement.  Remand for the District Court 
to consider these allegations and aspect of the Complaint in this case in light of the new decision 
is appropriate.  This District Judge’s decision granting the motion to dismiss and denying leave 
to amend should be reversed and the case remanded. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Scandit misstates the language of the Commission Compensation Plan (“CCP”) in a 
misleading fashion, falsely implying (a) that the key language in the CCP states that the 
commission will be “prepaid” and (b) that actual payment by the customer is a condition that 
must occur before payment is due.  Scandit in its Statement of Facts accurately characterizes the 
CCP as providing “for commissions based on the monetary value of legally binding contracts 
and purchase orders secured with new and existing customers in Savage’s territory.”1  However, 
by going on to state as a fact that the “CCP provides that anticipated commissions will be 
‘prepaid’ as ‘soon as reasonably practical following booking of the order, and no later than thirty 
days of the end of the month during which the transaction has been booked,”2 Scandit misstates 
the language of the contract.  The specific sentence at issue is improperly parsed by Scandit with 
                                                 
1 Respondent’s Brief at p. 3. 
2 Respondent’s Brief at p. 4. 
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quotations to make it look like it is a single sentence that uses the word “prepaid.”  However, the 
real CCP sentence described does not use the word “prepaid,” but actually says: 
100% of the respective commission will be paid as soon as 
reasonably practicable following the booking of the Order, and 
ideally no later than within 30 days of the end of the month during 
which the transaction has been booked.3 
It is a mischaracterization and a misleading of the Court to imply, as Scandit does by use of 
quotations around the word “prepaid,” that that the sentence described in the CCP actually uses 
the word “prepaid.”  A misstatement that is made especially egregious by the fact that central to 
this case is whether the respective commission at issue was “wages due” to be paid to the 
employee. 
Also misleading is Scandit’s attempt to set up a strawman argument and then tip it over 
by claiming that “conspicuously absent from Savage’s Complaint, however, is any allegation that 
Scandit received payment from Amazon – the critical event that must occur before any 
commission is ‘earned’ under the CCP.”4  Scandit is oddly grabbing part of the language of the 
conditions subsequent from the CCP and ignoring the key “criteria” for the commission is “to be 
paid”, i.e., the actual language of CCP cited by Scandit says: 
Commissions shall become earned (i.e., not subject to 
recoupment or “claw-back” by Employer) only upon (a) 
recognition of revenue by Scandit according to its then current 
revenue recognition policies, and (b) actual receipt of payment 
from the customer.5 
                                                 
3 R. at 18 (emphasis in bold added). 
4 Respondent’s Brief at 4-5. 
5 R. at 18 (emphasis in bold added).. 
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But this language requiring “actual receipt of payment” is not found in the “criteria” that are laid 
out in the sentence following the “100% of the respective commission will be paid” sentence, 
namely that “[i]n order for a closed transaction to be formally booked and the commission to be 
paid, the following criteria need to be fulfilled to the reasonable satisfaction of Scandit: [listing 
criteria related to booking, none of which include actual receipt of payment].”6  Compliance with 
all those criteria is indeed alleged in the Complaint and thus taken as true for purposes of 
evaluating a Motion to Dismiss.  Further, the Complaint alleges that the commission/wage was 
not paid on the date it was due in that either: 
a. it was not paid within 15 days of September 30, 2016, as required by 
Idaho Code § 45-608(2); or 
b. it was not paid within 30 days of the last day of the month in which the 
order had been booked as had been the case with prior commission 
payments under the CCP and the pattern and practice and course of 
performance between Scandit and Savage.7 
In other words, under the CCP, “100% of the respective commission” compensation for labor 
and service was agreed to be paid on booking, and it was either (a) due by statute no later than 15 
days of the end of the pay period in which it became due under the CCP; or (b) due by contract 
within 30 days of the last day of the month in which the order had been booked under the CCP.   
                                                 
6 R. at 18 (emphasis in bold added). 
7 R. at 8 (paragraph 30). 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. THE COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED SAVAGE’S WAGE CLAIM 
1. The Wage Claim Act Applies to Wages and Expressly Defines Commissions 
as Such When, as Is Alleged to be the Case Here, the Commissions are 
Compensation for Labor and Services Rendered by an Employee.  
It goes without saying that the Wage Claim Act only applies to wages earned by 
employees and requires that “[employers] shall pay all wages due to their employees at least 
once a month during a calendar month, on regular paydays designated in advance by their 
employers.”  Idaho Code § 45-608 (emphasis added).  The Idaho statute unambiguously defines 
“commissions” that are compensation for labor or services as “wages” when it says “wages 
means compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is 
determined by time, task, piece or commission basis.”  Idaho Code § 45-601(7) (emphasis 
added).  There is no dispute in this case that the commission was to compensate for labor or 
services, and therefore was “wages” per Idaho Code § 45-601(7).  Indeed, the CCP is fully titled 
as the “2016 Commission Compensation Plan . . . Senior Sales Executive Karen Savage 
(“Employee”)” and says that it is “intended to reward the following achievements [by 
Employee]: Generating significant license revenues . . . and closing sales transactions that can be 
recorded as revenue consistent with Scandit’s Revenue Recognition.”8  The Complaint alleges 
that the commission and bonus at issue “constitute a wage pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-601(7) in 
that they were ‘compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee on a time, task, 
piece or commission basis.’”  Thus, the dispute in this case is not whether “wages” are 
                                                 
8 R. at 16. 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 6 
involved—as clearly wages as defined by statute are involved—but rather whether those wages 
(a) were not paid when “due” (Idaho Code § 45-608(1) and (2)), (b) were not paid at a time a 
jury could find they were “due and owing” (§ 45-615(2)), and/or (c) were not “paid” at the time 
the CCP requires they be “paid,” i.e., upon booking. 
Because Scandit has saddled itself with a California law-based contract in the form of the 
CCP, it is now attempting to shoehorn California cases and law regarding whether a commission 
qualifies as a wage by virtue of being earned under California law into Idaho cases that have 
struggled with whether disparate non-commission items, items not listed in the same fashion as 
“commissions” under I.C. § 45-601(7) expressly as “wages.”  See Scandit’s citation of Bilow v. 
Preco, Inc., 132 Idaho 23, 966 P.2d 23 (1998)(involving whether “deferral account” was wages), 
and Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141 (2005)(involving whether money due 
as a function of liquidated damages provision in executive employment agreement was wages).9  
Scandit cites these cases for the proposition that “all forms of compensation must be “earned” 
before they become “wages” for purposes of the Wage Claim Act.”10 
These cases (a) do not say that; and (b) do not involve a commission that is defined by 
statute as a wage.  If indeed Idaho law required that an amount be “due” or “earned” before it can 
be called a wage, then why does the definition of wages in I.C. § 45-601(7) include no 
requirement that the compensation first be “due.”  Why does the language in § 45-615 speak in 
terms of “unpaid wages found due and owing”?  And why does § 45-608(1) speak in terms of 
                                                 
9 Respondent’s Brief at 9. 
10 Respondent’s Brief at 9. 
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“Employers shall pay all wages due” and does not speak in terms of “earned” but merely says 
when wages are “due,” they must be paid?  If the scheme was indeed that any form of 
compensation must be earned before it can be considered wages under the act, then there would 
be no point to so word these statutes. 
Both the Bilow and Moore cases cite to Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 759 
P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1988), which actually enumerates two characteristics of “wages” as (1) 
“compensation earned in increments as services are performed” or (2) “compensation paid in 
direct consideration of services rendered.”  Id. at 634, 759 P.2d at 925.  Interestingly, the Moore 
decision does not include the words “earn” or “earned” even once, but does say “[t]he definition 
of ‘wage’ includes any ascertainable unpaid commissions . . . .”  Id. at 819, 118 P.3d at 151 
(citations omitted)(emphasis added).  Thus, neither of those cases precisely equates “earned” to 
being the absolute touchstone of whether a commission is indeed a wage.  The case that those 
two cases cite does cite to the obvious definition of “wage” as including unpaid commissions.  
Cf. Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, No. 44416, 2017 WL 6521897, at *4 (Idaho Dec. 
21, 2017)(not released for publication in the permanent law reports)(referring to payment of 
“commission wages” over and over in discussing whether issue of fact existed that such wages 
were due).  Again, there does not seem to be a dispute here that this commission was in the 
nature of “compensation for services rendered” and therefore a “wage”; the dispute is centered 
on when the particular commission became “due and owing,” a point at which a jury could easily 
find was upon the booking of the revenue associated with the sale resulting in the commission.   
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In Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000), the employer argued—in a 
manner very similar to Scandit’s argument in the present case—that “due to the nature of 
commission sales, the actual amount of wages due to the Polks on the day they resigned could 
not have been known.  [The employer] claims that since some of the [sales of mobile] homes did 
not close, it would have actually overpaid the Polks if it had paid the amount the Polks had 
demanded.”  Id.  The Polk court characterized this as an argument that commissions were “not 
ascertainable,” and rejected the same, focusing in on Idaho Code § 45-615(2) and its instruction 
to base the amount of a wage claim judgment on the “unpaid wages found due and owing” to 
hold that “the amount of damages was due” at the time of demand “as found by the trier of fact.”  
Id. at 309, 17 P.3d at 253 (emphasis added).11   
In the very recent case of Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, No. 44416, 2017 
WL 6521897, at *4 (Idaho Dec. 21, 2017)(not released for publication in the permanent law 
reports), this Court discussed “commission wages” as part of an employee’s compensation, and 
considered whether a genuine issue of material fact existed over counts in a complaint by the 
employee “that he was owed commission wages due on contracts he procured before his 
resignation.” Id. (emphasis added).  The Nettleton opinion never considered that a commission 
could not be “wages” unless “earned.”  In fact, the Nettleton opinion never used the words “earn” 
or “earned” even once. 
                                                 
11 Polk cited with approval Smith v. Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 106 Idaho 846, 683 P.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he 
question [for the trier of fact] merely [was] was a sum due, and if so, how much,” despite parties’ dispute as the 
exact amount of percentage rate of commissions at termination); and Kaylac v. Canyon County, 119 Idaho 650, 652, 
809 P.2d 511, 513 (Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting argument that amount of wages due in cumulative personal leave to 
deputy sheriff was not “ascertainable until the conclusion of the grievance process”).  Polk, 17 P.3d at 253. 
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California, unlike Idaho, actually uses the word “earned” in its statutory equivalent of 
I.C. § 45-608(1) (first sentence).  Thus, it is not surprising that California’s Supreme Court, 
citing this “earned” statutory language, has recognized that “commissions are not earned or owed 
until agreed-upon conditions have been satisfied.”  Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2016 WL 
5390245, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2016)(citing holding of Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, 
Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 662, 668, 328 P.3d 1028, 1032 (2014)).  This is the earned-in-order-to-be-
deemed-wages test that Scandit is attempting to forcibly graft onto Idaho’s express statutory 
language regarding “commissions,” “due” and “due and owing”12; the test that simply does not 
fit Idaho law.  The commission here clearly was a “wage” by statutory definition.  The issue 
simply is, under a motion to dismiss standard, has it been sufficiently alleged that that 
commission wages were “due” on booking the sale.  Scandit concedes that “for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss and appellate review of the District Court’s dismissal . . . , the Court considers 
Savage’s non-conclusory and well-pled factual allegations to be true.”13 
                                                 
12See Idaho Code §§ 45-601(7), 608(1) (first sentence), and 615(2).  Scandit argues that the reference in Idaho Code 
§ 45-608(1) (second sentence) to an employer “depositing wages due or to become due or an advance of wages to be 
earned in a [bank account] of the employee’s choice” somehow equates “earned” with “due.”  Savage posits that the 
reference to “become due” and “advance of wages” highlights, in fact, that the Idaho Legislature is aware of a subtle 
difference in connotation between “due” and/or “earned,” chose to use both words in that one sentence regarding 
deposit of wages or of money to become wages into the employee’s bank account, but only to use “due” or “due and 
owing” elsewhere in the Wage Claim Act, not “earned,” when discussing the point at which wages must be paid.  
California, however, in its statutory scheme used “earned” and recognized that “commissions are not earned or owed 
until agreed-upon conditions have been satisfied.”  Supra. 
13 Respondent’s Brief at n. 1, p. 3. 
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2. Employers Are Free to Define by Contract When a Commission/Wage is 
“Due,” Including When a Commission Must be Paid, But Once That Criteria 
is Met, any Recoupment or Clawback is a Deduction from Wages Already 
Due and Paid. 
Contrary to Scandit’s argument, the court in Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 
Idaho 185, 189, 108 P.3d 332, 336 (2005), was not struggling with whether a commission had to 
be “earned” to be a wage.14 The issue in Bakker was whether the employee had any right to the 
commission/wage being due/earned at that point in time.  The district court below had 
“concluded that the contract was unambiguous and required that Bakker be employed at close of 
escrow in order to be paid the commission.”  Bakker, 141 Idaho at 189, 108 P.3d at 336.  The 
argument in Bakker was whether public policy prohibited contracting for when a commission/wage 
became due.  The court’s holding clearly was focused on allowing freedom of contract to establish 
the time under Idaho Code § 45-608 when a commission/wage became due: 
Under federal and state law, an employee must be paid a minimum of 
$5.15 for all hours worked. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); I.C. § 44–1502. As 
expressed in Idaho law, an employee might find himself paid on a 
time, task, piece or commission basis. I.C. § 45-601(7) (“Wages” 
means compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, 
whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece or 
commission basis.). Under I.C. § 45–608, an employer is required to 
adhere to a schedule paying its employees at least once a month. In 
conjunction, these laws require an employer only to pay a minimum 
wage for all hours worked and to pay employees at least monthly. 
Beyond that, the Wage Claim Act does not place any limitations on 
the ability of the employer and employee to contract for the terms of 
the employee’s compensation. 
Thus, when Scandit argues that Bakker stands for the proposition that “when a 
commission becomes ‘earned’ such that it is a ‘wage’ under the wage claim act is determined by 
                                                 
14 Respondent’s Brief at 9 and 10. 
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contract,” Scandit is misinterpreting the holding in that case and the clearly expressed language 
of Idaho statute.15  Why?  Because Scandit wants to shoehorn this case into a number of 
California law cases which struggled with whether a commission was indeed a wage under 
California law and use the “earned” test.  Idaho law, statutorily and Bakker, was not laboring 
under that deficiency.  Idaho law defines commissions as wages.  The answer and ruling of 
Bakker applied in this context, is succinctly that employers and employees may by contract 
establish when a commission/wage is “due” for purposes of Idaho Code § 45-608.  Indeed, 
hidden in Scandit’s argument is a quote to Bakker as holding “employers are free to ‘contract for 
the terms of compensation regarding when wages are earned and/or due.’”16  Bakker, in 
conjunction with Idaho Code § 45-608, is the real central issue of this case, namely under the 
CCP, is this commission, undisputedly a wage, due on the booking of the Amazon sale?  The 
contract can unambiguously be read that way, or if a juror could so find in the event of an 
ambiguity in any material language to that point, then the district judge’s decision was in error 
and must be reversed. 
There is language in Bakker that has application here, namely that employers and 
employees can “contract for the terms of compensation regarding when wages are earned and/or 
due, as long as relevant law is respected.”  Id. at 190, 108 P.3d at 337 (emphasis added).  In 
this case, “100% of the respective commission will be paid as soon as reasonably practicable 
                                                 
15 See also Respondent’s Brief at 11 (Scandit cites Bakker as “holding that Plaintiff has not ‘earned’ her commission 
under the plain language of her contract and therefore had no ‘unpaid wages’ and thus no claim under the Wage 
Claim Act”). 
16 Respondent’s Brief at 10 (quoting Bakker) (emphasis added to Bakker language). 
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following the booking of the Order.”  That language however creates a time certain to pay an 
ascertainable commission wage because it falls within Idaho Code Section 45-608(2).  That 
section, working in conjunction with Section 45-608(1) to require that once a wage becomes due 
during a particular pay period, it must be paid in full within 15 days of the end of that pay period: 
(1) Employers shall pay all wages due to their employees at least 
once during each calendar month, on regular paydays designated in 
advance by the employer, in lawful money of the United States . . . 
(2) The end of the pay period for which payment is made on a 
regular payday shall be not more than fifteen (15) days before such 
regular payday . . . . 
Idaho Code Section 45-608.  Other Idaho law provides that an employer may not “withhold or 
divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless . . . the employer has a written authorization 
from the employee for deductions for a lawful purpose.”  Idaho Code § 45-609(1).  So, if an 
employer says that a commission wage will be paid at a certain point by contract, the law that 
must be respected includes payment of that amount within fifteen days of the end of the pay 
period within which that amount became due, and that any future deductions from that amount 
must only be made with written authorization. 
In addition to saying 100% of the commission will be paid upon booking of revenue, the 
CCP here narrowly defines “earned,” saying “[c]ommission shall become earned (i.e., not 
subject to recoupment or “claw-back” by Employer) only upon [revenue recognition and actual 
payment].”17 The next sentence of the CCP goes on to say that if “one or both of these conditions 
                                                 
17 R. at 18 (emphasis added). 
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fail to occur, the paid but unearned commissions must be returned to Scandit by Employee.” 18  
“Recoupment” is “a common law doctrine which arose as an equitable rule of joinder to avoid 
the necessity of bringing separate actions for two claims.  It permits a defendant to defend 
against the plaintiff by asserting a countervailing claim that arose out of the ‘same transaction.’”  
In re Denby Stores, Inc., 86 B.R. 768, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing 3 J. Moore, Moore’s 
Federal Practice ¶ 13.02 at 1313 (2 ed. 1985); 20 Am.Jur.2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment & 
Setoff, §§ 16–18 (1965)).  Likewise, “claw back” too sounds like taking something back that has 
already been ascertained and paid, a countervailing charge back or a “reversal.”  The CCP at § V 
is titled “COMMISSION PAYMENT REVERSALS” and speaks in terms of “revers[ing] prior 
commissions that have been “prepaid” and also says that “commissions . . . will be recalculated 
and recovered accordingly.”  (Emphasis added.)  Again, this wording implies an amount that 
initially was “ascertainable,” and previously “due and owing” under Idaho law.  “Recalculate” 
implies that it was already calculated once and due, i.e., already “ascertainable” and due and 
paid.19  Even the timing for any necessary adjustment to the paycheck for “recoupment or 
                                                 
18 R. at 18 (emphasis added). 
19 Scandit puts undue emphasis on the sporadic use of the word “prepaid” in the contract.  See, e.g., Respondent’s 
Brief at 4.  But such reference also is easily reconcilable as used as simply meaning “previously paid”, i.e., the 
commission that was due and previously paid, which now is subject to recoupment or claw-back as a condition 
subsequent has occurred.  For example, this seems to be the sense that it is used in the contract when it is indicated 
“therefore, should one or both of these conditions fail to occur, the paid but unearned commissions must be returned 
to Scandit by Employee per Section V below.  Employee’s obligation to return any prepaid but unearned 
commission survives any termination of the Employee’s engagement with Scandit, and Employee agrees that such 
amounts may be deducted from Employee’s final paycheck . . . .”  R. at 18.  The oddity of the position advocated by 
Scandit under the contract that the commission is not wages until “earned” is made even more absurd by the fact that 
there technically would be no wages comprising commissions until the final paycheck of the employee’s career, as 
that is the only point that Scandit has written in its right to deduct from paycheck wages to “return a prepaid but 
unearned commission”.  R. at 18. 
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clawback” under the CCP is deferred until it is “deducted from Employee’s final paycheck.” 20  
Again, sounding like the undoing of wages that were already due. 
Thus, the employer’s choice of wording in the CCP to set forth that “100% of respective 
commission will be paid [upon booking]” had consequences under the relevant law.  The limited 
definition of “earned” as used under the CCP does not supplant the 100% of commission due 
language.  The CCP’s limited definition of “earned” does not accord with “due” as used under 
Idaho law to mean ascertainable and owing and cannot override the directive of the law that 
when commission wages are due they must be paid within a certain time of the end of the pay 
period when they became due and the only deductions from that point forward for wages have to 
be authorized in writing by the employee. 
3. Under the CCP, a Commission/Wage is Due Upon Booking.   
Scandit argues that the CCP in this case “defines exactly when commissions are ‘earned’ 
and therefore become wages under the Wage Claim Act” and that the CCP provides that 
“Commissions shall become earned (i.e., not subject to recoupment or ‘claw-back’ by [Scandit]) 
only upon . . . actual receipt of payment from the customer.”21  Appellant Savage’s Complaint 
would not have been filed and no confusion or ambiguity or argument introduced, had Scandit 
stopped its CCP contract there and not gone on, as it did, to include the following language 
immediately thereafter: 
Therefore, should one or both of these conditions fail to occur, the 
paid but unearned commissions must be returned to Scandit by 
                                                 
20 R. at 18. 
21 Respondents Brief at 10, citing R. at 18, Section IV. 
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Employee per Section V below.  Employee’s obligation to return 
any prepaid but unearned commission survives any termination of 
the Employee’s engagement with Scandit, and Employee agrees 
that such amounts may be deducted from Employee’s final 
paycheck including severance payments, if any. 
100% of the respective commission will be paid as soon as 
reasonably practicable following the booking of the Order, and 
ideally no later than within 30 days of the end of the month during 
which the transaction has been booked.  In order for a closed 
transaction to be formally booked and the commission to be paid, 
the following criteria need to be fulfilled to the reasonable 
satisfaction of Scandit:   
[listing criteria relating to booking an order, not including “actual 
receipt of payment from the customer”] 
If there are any contingencies (e.g., exit clauses) in the 
arrangement with the customer, Scandit reserves the right not to 
book the sale and withhold commission until the contingency has 
expired. 
Scandit reserves the right to withhold the respective sales 
commission until all the above tasks are complete [apparently 
referring to the above criteria for booking].22 
Thus, Scandit is in error when it argues that there is no ambiguity under the CCP because Scandit 
had not yet been paid by Amazon, “no commission had become ‘earned’ and the amount claimed 
by Scandit [sic “Savage”] was not a ‘wage due’ under the Wage Claim Act.”23  The common 
sense import of the above bolded language within Section IV could lead a reasonable person to 
believe that payment of the commission/wage by contract under the CCP was due upon booking 
of the revenue from the associated sale. 
                                                 
22 R. at 18, Section IV (emphasis in bold added). 
23 Respondent’s Brief at 11. 
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4. The CCP Cannot be Characterized as Simply Providing for a Prepayment 
Against Future Commissions Due or Providing for Simply an Advance and 
Therefore Not Wages.  
Scandit attempts to characterize the CCP as “at all times distinguish[ing] between when 
Scandit will pre-pay (i.e., advance) commission payments and when such commission payments 
in fact become earned.”24  First, the word “advance” never appears within the CCP.25  Scandit’s 
use of the phrase “at all times” treats the CCP as if the “100% of the respective commission will 
be paid as soon as reasonably practicable following the booking” and associated language cited 
in the Opening Brief26 was not included in the contract.  To say 100% of the respective 
commission will be paid is not an instance of merely providing for pre-payment “at all times.”  
To say that “Scandit reserves the right not to book the sale and withhold commission” is not an 
instance of at all times providing merely for pre-payment or advancement.  To say “Scandit 
reserves the right to withhold the respective sales commission until all of the above tasks 
[relating to booking] are complete” is not maintaining that the payment required to be made upon 
booking is merely a pre-payment or advance of the commission.  On the contrary, that 
contractual language is providing that payment of the commission is due upon booking.  Indeed, 
undoubtedly to Scandit’s chagrin at this point, there is not one mention of the word “advance” in 
the entire contract.  How easy would it have been for Scandit simply to leave out the “100% of 
the respective commission will be paid [upon booking]” language and instead say, for example 
                                                 
24 Respondent’s Brief at 11. 
25 Under Idaho law, “the word ‘advance’, as ordinarily used, implies a loan.”  B. J. Carney & Co. v. Murphy, 68 
Idaho 376, 382, 195 P.2d 339, 342 (1948) (case criticized on other grounds, Lockwood Graders of Idaho, Inc. v. 
Neibaur, 80 Idaho 123, 127, 326 P.2d 675, 676 (1958)). 
26 See R. at 18 and Opening Brief at pp. 24-25. 
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“an amount equal to 100% of the respective commission may be advanced, at the discretion of 
Scandit, upon booking”? 
Once having set up the fiction that the CCP merely provides for an advance, not that 
wages are indeed due, Scandit trots out the argument based on California case law that an 
advance of a commission is not a wage because it has not yet been “earned.”  It cites the case of 
Steinhebel v. Los Angeles Times Commc'ns, 126 Cal. App. 4th 696, 704-06 (2005); Gress v. 
Fabcon, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 922 F. Supp. 
2d 278 (U.S.D.C. E.D.N.Y. 2013).27   
Steinhebel is distinguishable because, as noted previously,28 under California law, the 
statutory definition utilizes the word “earned” not due, and the California Supreme Court’s 
resulting holding that “commissions are not earned or owed until agreed-upon conditions have 
been satisfied.”  Nguyen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2016 WL 5390245, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 
2016)(citing holding of Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 662, 668, 328 P.3d 
1028, 1032 (2014)).  As argued in Savage’s Opening Brief,29 an “advance” is materially different 
from the situation where an employee has the present contractual right, without any condition 
precedent, to payment of the commission.  That amount is “due”.  This is the case even if the 
commission once ascertained and paid is subject to a condition subsequent or forfeiture.  
Steinhebel also flies in the face of Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 311, 17 P.3d 247, 255 
(2000)(“[the employer] will not be allowed to escape the wage claim penalty by claiming that the 
                                                 
27 Respondent’s Brief at 12, also citing other cases that require commission to be earned before it is wages. 
28 See supra at Section III.A.1 
29 Opening Brief at p. 22-23. 
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amount was unascertainable prior to trial” because the jury is charged to find what is due and 
owing).  Smith v. Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 106 Idaho 846, 683 P.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1984) (despite the 
parties’ dispute as to “the exact amount of the percentage rate of commission” at termination, the 
question for the trier of fact was, “was a sum due, and if so, how much.”).  The CCP here and the 
language of “100% of the respective commission will be paid as soon as reasonably practicable 
following the booking” clearly sets forth that a commission/wage is due upon booking.  The 
language relied upon by Scandit for its “advance” argument is really in the nature of a condition 
subsequent.  As explained in Savage’s Opening Brief, another California case, Harris v. 
Investor’s Bus. Daily, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), distinguishes 
Steinhebel by virtue of contractual language which “suggested that the points [upon which the 
commission was based] were earned [i.e., “due”] at the time of the sale, not at some designated 
point in the future.”30 
The Gress v. Fabcon, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), case is also 
distinguishable on the basis that it does not come from a state where commissions are defined by 
statute to constitute wages.  The Gress court actually relied upon its perception that the 
commission in question was not related to the employee’s labor, but to factors outside of his 
control and therefore could not be wages.  Gress in this respect was later severely criticized in 
                                                 
30 Savage’s Opening Brief at p. 23-24.  Again, Scandit cannot narrowly define “earned” in words of condition 
subsequent (clawback-recoupment) and expect that to override Idaho law that wages must be paid when “due and 
owing.”  That is akin to the parties to a sale of a cow re-labeling the item sold as a “goat” and demanding that no 
brand inspection occur because that is for the sale of “cows”. 
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Prime Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), wherein the court 
indicated plaintiff’s claim in that case:   
Nichols’s compensation seems analogous to a commission, except for the fact that 
her pay was linked not exclusively to her own work, but to the overall success of 
[her employer].  [Citation omitted.]  In Gress v. Fabcon, Inc. [citation omitted], 
this court held that sales commissions, payable on a monthly basis based on the 
prior month's accounting, and “based upon the profitability of the salesperson's 
individual projects,” were not “wages” within the meaning of the Wage Payment 
Statute.   The court noted that under Indiana Code section § 22-2-5-1, employers 
must pay their employees “at least semi-monthly or biweekly,” and that “payment 
shall be made for all wages earned to a date not more than ten (10) days prior to 
the date of payment.”  Id. at 3. In concluding the commissions were not “wages,” 
the court found highly relevant that “because of the length of time involved in 
determining the final commission, it was simply impossible for [the employer] to 
know what [the employee] was owed with ten days.”  Id. 
 
However, Gress conflicts with previous decisions holding that commissions are 
“wages” under the Wage Payment Statute.   [Citing five previous cases.]  Gress 
did not attempt to distinguish or purport to disagree with any of these cases, and 
out of these previous cases cited only Wank [740 N.E. 2d 908, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000)] in support of an unrelated statement. 
 
Prime Mortgage USA, Inc. v. Nichols, 855 N.E.2d at 665 (emphasis added). 
 
Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 278 (U.S.D.C. E.D.N.Y. 2013), is cited by 
Scandit for the proposition that under the laws of nine states, “advances” are not “wages” and 
therefore a claim for unauthorized deductions from “wages” would not stand for recalculation of 
certain commissions earned by Roto-Rooter employees.  This case is likewise distinguishable.  
Scandit ignores the fact that the Morangelli court found the employer had reserved a right and 
effectively amended the contract to define the prior payment of commissions as an advance.  In 
that case, specifically, the issue was whether (a) after an amount for the commission had been 
calculated based on a Roto-Rooter technician’s work at a particular job, and (b) if later warranty 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 20 
work caused that commission to be paid to the person who had to do the warranty work and 
deducted from what had previously been paid out to the original technician, if (c) that was an 
illegal deduction from a wage of the original technician.  The language of the contract at issue in 
Morangelli provided that "commissions are based upon the amounts collected or billed 
(authorized) depending on the type of work done, LESS ... any special charges for each job such 
as insurance surcharges that the company may deem necessary and may impose from time to 
time."  Id. at 296 (emphasis added to original contract language by Morangelli court).  This is 
distinguishable from the situation at hand.  The CCP here does not allow an employer’s ongoing 
amendment of the obligation to pay the commission for whatever “special charges” Scandit may 
deem necessary and may impose from time to time.  There is simply no such modification or 
qualification—i.e., no condition precedent--to the “100% of the respective commission will be 
paid [upon booking]” language in this CCP. 
5. Conditions Subsequent Analysis is Applicable.   
Scandit argues that “this case does not turn on some distinction between an ‘advance’ and 
a ‘commission subject to a condition subsequent’” and that no case mentioned by Savage so 
much as mentions the concept of a condition subsequent.31  However, Scandit does note an Idaho 
definition of a condition subsequent from the case of Lakeland True Value Hardware, LLC v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 716,725,291 P.3d 399, 408 (2012).  
                                                 
31 Respondent’s Brief at 14. 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 21 
First, Lakeland cites to Corpus Juris Secundum on Contracts for that definition.  Second, 
the language that Scandit glaringly omits from the middle of the quotation Scandit takes from 
Lakeland is as follows: 
A condition subsequent presumes a valid contract and refers to a future 
event, which divests a preexisting contractual liability. 
 
Lakeland, 153 Idaho at 725, 291 P.3d at 408 (emphasis added).  This language cited in Lakeland 
and omitted from Scandit’s brief, would seem to fit exactly to the situation here where the CCP 
was a valid contract with a preexisting contractual liability arising under the “100% of the 
respective commission will be paid [upon booking]” language.  That preexisting liability could 
then be divested, i.e., subject to recoupment or claw-back, upon a condition subsequent 
occurring.32   
Second, the fact that condition subsequent analysis is routinely applied to wage claims 
can be demonstrated by a Westlaw search of “All State & Federal” cases for “’condition 
subsequent” /s wage” and the resulting 36 cases.  The law of the state of Kansas is particularly 
apt here because in its wage claim act, Kansas specifically provides that any “condition 
subsequent” which imposes a forfeiture of earned wages is a violation of the Kansas wage claims 
act.  See, e.g., Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 755 F. Supp. 354, 360 (D. Kan. 1990) 
(citing to K.S.A. 44-315(a)).  Thus, there is a body of law discussing when an after-the-fact 
condition of defeasance as to all or a portion of a wage previously due is a condition subsequent.  
Kansas courts have defined a condition precedent under the Kansas wage statutes as: 
                                                 
32 R. at 18, Section IV. 
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something that is agreed must happen or be performed before a 
right can occur to enforce the main contract. It is one without the 
performance of which the contract entered into between the parties 
cannot be enforced. A condition precedent requires the 
performance of some act or happening of some event after the 
terms of the contract, including the condition precedent, have been 
agreed on before the contract shall take effect. Weinzirl, supra, 677 
P.2d at 1008. 
Smith, 755 F.Supp. at 360, n. 4 (citing Weinzirl v. Wells Group, Inc., 677 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Kan. 
1984)).  In the Smith case, the plaintiff was a sales person for MCI who claimed that she had not 
been paid a proper commission pursuant to her written compensation plan, just like Savage in the 
present case.  Put succinctly, the court stated: 
[A]lthough Kansas law permits an employer to impose a condition 
precedent on its obligation to pay an employee wages, once an 
employee's right to earned wages becomes absolute, a condition 
subsequent cannot impose a forfeiture. Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 
F.2d 1073, 1084 (10th Cir.1985) (applying Kansas law) (citations 
omitted).  In determining whether a wage is earned, a court's task 
is "one of deciding whether the documents drafted by the employer 
place a condition precedent on entitlement to the [wage] or 
whether they attempt to impose a forfeiture." Id., quoting Morton 
Buildings, Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 10 
Kan.App.2d 197, 695 P.2d 450, 453 (1985).33 
Id. at 356.  In ruling for the employee, the court rejected MCI’s contention that the commissions 
did not achieve the status of earned wages until the customer had used the service for a billing 
period and the amount of the usage was determined and billed and the usage of the service was 
sufficient to satisfy as a “qualifying sale.”  However, the court found that MCI could “point to no 
                                                 
33 In Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988), the Kansas Supreme Court overruled a statement in Morton 
relating to whether a prior case called Murphy by the Kansas Supreme Court was limited to actions in which the 
employee was discharged for filing a worker’s compensation claim.  This overruling has nothing to do with the 
holdings for which Morton is cited herein. 
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provision in the contract which defines commissions in this manner. Instead, the contract 
expressly provides that commissions are earned upon sales and that the amount of commissions 
is to be determined based upon the first month's billings.”  Id. at 360 (emphasis in original). 
Although obviously in Smith, the court was focused on language which used the word 
“earned” that contract did not narrowly define “earned” in language of forfeiture as does the 
CCP here.  The “100% of the respective commission will be paid [upon booking]” language 
suffices in exactly the same way under the CCP in the present case to establish the point the 
commission became “due” under the CCP.  After that point, the definition of “earned” under the 
contract speaks in terms of a claw-back or recoupment, both types of forfeitures, both of which 
meet the test laid out in Smith and under associated Kansas law of a condition subsequent.  Idaho 
does not have the prohibition against such conditions subsequent divesting an employee of 
wages, nevertheless that does not change the fact that the test for whether something is a 
condition subsequent or a condition precedent to a wage is just as valid and persuasive in the 
instant case.  As the Smith court found, the employees at issue “became vested with the right to 
receive undetermined scheduled commissions, as earned wages, at the time they sold MCI 
service. The fact that the various scheduled payments could not be calculated until several 
months after service was sold does not impair this vested right.”  Id.  Likewise, the CCP in the 
present case says that “100% of the respective commission will be paid [upon booking].”  
Everything after those wages were due in terms of a recoupment or a claw-back is a condition 
subsequent. 
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6. “Arithmetically Ascertainable” is Indeed the Test for When Wages in the 
Form of a Commission May Become Due Under Idaho Code § 45-608. 
Scandit argues that the Idaho cases cited by Savage stand only for the proposition that 
whether an alleged commission is “ascertainable” is only a preliminary issue in the 
determination of whether a commission has become earned, not the deciding factor.34  Clearly, 
the definition of “wage” includes any ascertainable unpaid commissions.  Moore v. Omnicare, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 819 P.3d 141, 151 (2005), citing Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 309, 17 
P.3d 247, 253 (2000); Neal v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 107 Idaho 681, 683, 691 P.2d 1296, 
1298 (Ct.App. 1984).  With respect to Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000), 
Scandit claims that the contract there did not contain any conditions that had to occur before the 
employee would be deemed to have earned a commission on the sold houses.  All that Savage 
has argued is that is that when a wage commission is both (1) ascertainable and (2) due and 
owing, an employee has a cognizable claim under Idaho Code § 45-608, and that “earned” is not 
a magical prerequisite to commissions becoming “wages” under the Act.35 
A commission that is subject to a claw-back is ascertainable and if the parties’ agreement 
says it must be paid, then it is a wage that is due.  Cf. Meschino v. Frazier Industrial Company, 
2016 WL 4083342 at § 1 (U.S.D.Ct. Mass. 2016); Harris v. Investor’s Business Daily, Inc., 41 
Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 118 (Cal. App. 2006). 
Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (2000), contrary to Scandit’s argument, is 
entirely on point here.  As Scandit is arguing here that these conditions subsequent will prevent 
                                                 
34 Respondent’s brief at 15. 
35 Opening Brief of Appellant Savage at pp. 15-16. 
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the ascertainability of the commission at the time that the revenue is booked per the contract, so 
too in Polk v. Larrabee was the employer arguing that “since some of the homes did not close, it 
would have actually overpaid the Polks if it had paid the amount the Polks had demanded 
[because some of the sales might not close].”  The Polk court soundly rejected this, saying “[the 
employer] will not be allowed to escape the wage claim penalty by claiming that the amount was 
unascertainable prior to trial.”  Id. at 311, 17 P.3d at 255.  The court emphasized that the trier of 
fact—based on the language of Idaho Code § 45-615(2) directing the jury to determine the 
amount of the wage claim based on the amount of “unpaid wages found due and owing”—was 
charged to determine the amount due under the language of the contract.  Here, the CCP provides 
a basis for the jury to do that, i.e. “100% of the respective commission will be paid [upon 
booking].”  Here, just as in Polk, the question for the trier of fact is, upon booking of the 
Amazon sale “was a sum due, and if so, how much?”  Id. at 309, 17 P.3d at 253 (citing Smith v. 
Idaho Peterbilt, Inc., 106 Idaho 846, 683 P.2d 882 (Ct.App. 1984)).  The Complaint, as plead, 
alleges facts that allow the trier of fact to answer that a sum was due and to state the amount due. 
Scandit also attempts to bring the Meschino v. Frazier Industrial Company, 216 WL 
4083342 (D. Mass. August 1, 2016), case into supporting its position, when it clearly does not.36  
Scandit cites language from another aspect of the Meschino decision.  But the argument in 
Meschino that Frazier won on was related to the alleged impropriety of his employer taking 
deductions from his eligible commissions to recover losses incurred on failure to pay on other 
projects he was involved in.  In a manner similar to the condition subsequent analysis under the 
                                                 
36 Respondent’s Brief at 16. 
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Kansas wage claim statute above, the Massachusetts Supreme Court interpreted their wage claim 
statute “as banning any arrangement that would deduct or withhold payment of earned wages, 
even where the employee has given his assent.”  Meschino, 216 WL 4083342 * 4.  As noted in 
Savage’s Opening Brief, the Meschino court held that words in the parties’ contract to the effect 
that a “[c]ommission will be paid out at 50% of the commission payable in the first eligible 
period once the customer pays 50% or more of the order” effectively vested the right to the 
commission and that a future deduction would be in violation of the court-imposed prohibition 
on the same.  The court noted that the employer had every ability to change this result by 
inserting into the agreement the phrase “against the aggregate commission due at the end of the 
quarter” but it hadn’t done that and thus the commission had become due before the point of the 
deduction.  Id.   
This is exactly the case with the CCP language here that “100% of the respective 
commission will be paid [upon booking].”  The 100% paid language in this case is completely 
analogous to the “once the customer pays 50% or more of the order” language in the Meschino 
case.  They are both the key condition precedents that cause the right to payment of the 
ascertainable commission to vest.  Anything that happens after that point is in the nature of a 
condition of defeasance, a condition subsequent, but does not change the fact that at the earlier 
point in time the commission was (1) ascertainable, and (2) due. 
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7. Whether Amazon Made a Payment is Not a Condition Precedent to the 
Commission Being Due Under the CCP or Idaho Code § 45-608. 
Under the guise of again saying that whether a commission is “earned” is the touchstone 
of whether that commission comprises a “wage” under Idaho law,37 Scandit cites Bakker v. 
Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 (2005), as a case in which “the Idaho 
Supreme Court [allegedly] held . . . all forms of compensation must be ‘earned’ before they become 
‘wages’ and the parties can define by contract when a commission is ‘earned’ for purposes of the 
Wage Claim Act.”38  With all due respect to Scandit, that is not what is found on page 190 of the 
Bakker decision or anywhere else.  Indeed, that page says of the court decision interpreting the Wage 
Claim Act “This statement also does not dictate a clear public policy that employers and employees 
cannot contract for the terms of compensation regarding when wages are earned and/or due, as long 
as relevant law is respected.”  Id. at 190, 108 P.3d at 337.  Why would that sentence use “wages are 
earned” if compensation had to be earned before it could be considered wages?  Further, the use of 
“earned and/or due” also implies that the court is simply equating earned with due under Idaho Code 
§ 45-608, not using “earned” in the narrow sense employed in the CCP as not subject to recoupment 
or claw-back, not using “earned” in the sense California and other law advanced by Scandit being 
some sort of litmus test that must be positive before a commission is deemed to be wages. Under 
Idaho Code § 45-601(7), which defines wages as “compensation for labor or services rendered by 
an employee, whether the amount is determined by time, task, piece or commission basis,” it is 
                                                 
37 Which it is not, rather the test is simply whether the amount is ascertainable and due and owing.  See, e.g.  Moore 
v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 819, 118 P.3d 141, 151 (2005); Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 309, 17 P.3d 
247, 253 (2000); and Neal v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 107 Idaho 681, 683, 691 P.2d 1296, 1298 (Ct.App. 1984). 
38 Respondent’s Brief at 17, citing Bakker at 141 Idaho at 190. 
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possible there could be a dispute as to whether a commission that was paid to an employee 
conditioned on business activities or otherwise that had nothing to do with the employee’s labor 
or services could be construed as wages for labor or services rendered by that employee.  That is 
not the case here.  There is no test in Idaho that commissions have to be “earned” prior to being 
deemed wages.  In Bakker, the District Court’s conclusion that the contract was ambiguous and 
required that the employee be employed at the close of escrow in order to be paid the 
commission on the sale carried the day.  But that was only a conclusion that the contract did not 
make the commission “earned/due” until that condition precedent, i.e., employment on the date 
of close of escrow, had been satisfied.  In contrast to the CCP in the present case, which provides 
that “100% of the respective commission will be paid [upon booking].” 
Scandit attempts to argue that the CCP must be read as a whole and that Savage is taking 
the quote out of context.  But Savage is not focused just on those three words, but on several 
paragraphs in the CCP that describe what must occur for booking and describe the commission 
as being due.  It is Scandit who tries to put a twist on “prepaid” as meaning in advance, when 
what it really means is that a commission has been already paid and there are conditions of 
defeasance, i.e., recoupment or claw-back conditions, that may require a deduction from that 
commission.  It stretches the contract as a whole beyond all recognition to say that it 
unambiguously provides for simply an advance of the commission amount upon booking.39  The 
CCP says the “commission” in its entirety, i.e., 100%, is due at that point.  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
39 Opening Brief at pp. 24-25. 
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District Court acted improperly to grant the Motion to Dismiss and its decision and its decision 
should be reversed. 
B. A LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM WAS MADE THAT AN ACHIEVEMENT BONUS WAS 
DUE IN THE MONTH THAT IT WAS EARNED. 
The CCP at Section IV.E. provides for an “Annual Quota Achievement Bonus” stating: 
Employee will earn a bonus of USD 36,000 if the combined ACV 
[annual contract value] of renewals and Orders equals CHF 
641,001 or more. 
(Emphasis added.)  Clearly this bonus provision lacks the wordiness of the commission 
provision.  It does strike Savage as ironic that Scandit argues ad nauseum that the employer, by 
contract, gets to define when a commission is “earned” before it gains the dignity of being a 
wage.  However, now that Scandit has said, unequivocally, employee will earn a bonus of USD 
36,000 upon a milestone in renewals and orders equaling CHF [francs] 641,001, the district court 
found that even if that figure is achieved in the middle of the year, the employee must 
nevertheless wait until the end of the calendar year until that amount is “earned.”  The one case 
that Scandit cites for its proposition that any invocation of the word “annual” automatically 
means payment at year end is the Massachusetts Superior Court case of Boesel v. Swaptree, Inc., 
31 Mass.L.Rptr. 55, 2013 WL 7083258 (S.Ct. of Mass., Suffolk County, 2013).  However, that 
case is entirely distinguishable in that the language at issue made no reference whatsoever to any 
milestone that had to be achieved in order to “earn” the annual bonus.  Rather, unlike the CCP in 
the present case, the language in that case simply stated “[d]uring the Term, Executive shall be 
[sic] receive an ‘annual bonus’ of $25,000 per year.”  In other words, existing in your 
employment for a year was the only possible condition precedent to earning the annual bonus 
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because that contract stated no other possible condition precedent.  Incidentally too, that contract 
also provided for a time that that bonus shall be paid, i.e., saying that the annual bonus, along 
with another bonus “shall each be payable at the same time as such bonuses for [another 
executive officer] was payable.”  Id. at 2013 WL 7083258, at *2.  Further, instrumental to the 
court’s holding in Boesel was the fact that that date “was after the calendar year ended, February 
15, 2011”, the date for payment.  Id.  Of special note to the language here in the CCP, the Boesel 
court said: 
Reading the contract as a whole, it is clear the parties knew how to 
express an intention for the Annual Bonus to be earned ratably 
throughout the year.  Where such an intention was not expressed, 
the only reasonable inference is that the parties did not have the 
annual bonus earned other than by completion of employment for 
the year.   
Boesel, 2013 WL 7083258, at *5. Applying this reasoning to the CCP, there is a “ratable” 
milestone that determines when the bonus is earned, i.e., achieving the quota amount of CHF 
641,001, which could have even occurred in January.  In this case, that milestone occurred in 
September.  Just as noted in Paolini v. Albertson’s Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 
(2006), this “annual bonus based upon net profits [became] . . . due during a specific calendar 
month and [was] covered by the statute.”  Id.  The definitions of annual offered by Scandit do 
nothing but allude to the fact that annual covers a period of one year, which could be a calendar 
year or 12 months.  They do not speak to the situation where the definition of the bonus, as it 
does here, includes a milestone that triggers the earning of the bonus.  The absurd results that 
Scandit alleges as being threatened by such an arrangement can be easily dealt with by 
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employers who retain full control to revise and draft their annual compensation employment 
agreements.  For example, in this case, all Scandit had to do in the 2016 Compensation 
Agreement would be to modify the word “earned” by saying that the bonus in question was not 
earned or due until the end of the calendar year and would not be payable until that point.40  The 
failure to do so created the situation where Savage asks, in a reasonable manner, that she be 
given what was promised under the contract, i.e., that her achievement bonus be paid because 
she reached the requisite milestone of sales.   
With respect to the District Court’s reversal analysis, Scandit does not allege that it 
argued it before the Court below, but confirms by its silence on the point that the District Court 
brought it up sua sponte, after oral argument which is improper.41  Scandit attempts nevertheless 
to argue that the District Court was right in its analysis in this respect, saying that Scandit did 
reserve the right to reverse all quota credit and pre-paid commission corresponding to a portion 
of the order which remains uncollected for over 60 days from the due date.  However, Section V. 
of the CCP, which Scandit cites for this proposition, does not say that.  Rather, the language 
cited by Scandit is under a heading which refers only to reversing “commissions”, not to 
reversing bonuses.  In other words, that language has a heading and introduction that says: 
As discussed in Section IV, in the event Scandit does not recognize 
the revenue on an Order under generally accepted accounting 
principles (as applied by Scandit) or does not receive payment 
from the customer per the terms of the Order, any prepaid 
                                                 
40 And also not tie the word “earned” to a strict definition rooted in clawback and recoupment, i.e., language of 
forfeiture and condition subsequent. 
41 Respondent’s Brief at 22. 
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commissions will be reversed as described below: [list follows, 
including the quota language described by Scandit].42 
Scandit has pointed out many times the contract must be read as a whole and language in 
isolation must not be raised up to the detriment of other language.  Here, the introduction makes 
it clear that the reference to adjustment of the quota is solely for the purpose of reducing a 
commission.  There is no reference to reducing the quota.  ACV as used in the relevant provision 
is only defined at one location in the CCP.  Further, the term “ACV” is never directly tied into 
any language that would later reduce that ACV for purposes of the Achievement Bonus.  Rather, 
ACV is part of the calculation by which a quota is determined or leveled out for multi-year deals 
elsewhere in the contract.  But the correlation between the ACV reference in the Achievement 
Bonus and any later recoupment or claw back of a bonus (as opposed to a commission) is never 
made clear.  Consequently, “annual contract value” can mean simply a total of the amount of 
contracted sales booked as the same are booked.  In this case, that milestone was achieved in 
September of 2016.  In other words, under the language of the CCP, the annual quota 
achievement bonus seems to be hanging out there by itself independently and not tied to any 
other calculation of quota, commission or otherwise under the contract.  Thus, the District Judge 
was in error to dismiss this Complaint. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED SAVAGE’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND 
Scandit claims that “Savage points to no act by Scandit demonstrating an unequivocal 
intent to waive the CCP's requirement that Scandit receive payment from Amazon before any 
                                                 
42 R. at 20. 
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commission is ‘earned.’”43  This misses the mark for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, it is 
sufficient to allege that Scandit indicated that the commission had been booked.  But even if it 
had to be alleged that the Amazon commission had actually been paid by the customer, the 
proposed Amended Complaint included an averment that “(i) conversations between Savage and 
the Scandit Vice President of Sales during the months of September and October 2016 wherein 
he stated words to the effect that Savage had fulfilled all obligations to earn the Amazon 
Commission and that the Amazon Commission was due and would be paid, and/or by (ii) 
statements by Scandit's chief executive officer Samuel Mueller to Savage including, without 
limitation, statements in [the email attached to the Complaint].”44  The averment, especially with 
respect to the Vice President of Sales’ comments, taken as true as it must at this stage in the 
proceedings, more than sufficiently make out grounds to render the amendment valid rather than 
futile, thus it was error not to allow it.  The statements by the Vice President of Sales would 
constitute a false representation or a concealment of material fact if indeed full payment was the 
requirement.  Further, it would create an inconsistent position as well.   
Accordingly, it was error not to grant leave to file the proposed Amended Complaint. 
                                                 
43 Respondent’s Brief at 24. 
44 R. at 98-99. 
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D. SCANDIT’S DISCUSSION OF WHETHER THE AMAZON AGREEMENT WAS ALLEGEDLY 
ACTUALLY BOOKED UNDER THE GUISE OF TALKING ABOUT ITS PAYMENT OF THE 
ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE COMMISSION SHORTLY AFTER THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED 
IS AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROPERLY ARGUE EVIDENCE NOT ADDUCED ON THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS. 
It goes without saying that a motion to dismiss decision involves crediting the well plead 
allegations in the Complaint at face value.  At this early stage of the lawsuit under a motion to 
dismiss standard, it is taken as undisputed that the commission was booked by Scandit in exactly 
the manner that Savage alleges in her existing Complaint or that any conditions precedent to the 
commission being due were waived.  Scandit stated to the judge that the commission had been 
paid during oral argument on this matter.45  At the conclusion of this section in its appellate 
brief, Scandit decries that there will be dire consequences if this Court rules in favor of Savage’s 
position.  As with the prior times that Scandit has raised this false cry of alarm, the answer is that 
Scandit can simply amend and change the language of its contracts on a go forward basis to 
clearly provide that the commission is not yet due, that monies are simply an advance in the 
nature of a loan against future commissions due.  The failure to do so previously resulted in a 
reasonable expectation in the mind of Savage that 100% of her commission would be indeed be 
“due” on booking, and one that justice requires that this Court demand that Scandit fulfill.  
E. THE RECENT NETTLETON DECISION SHOULD BE APPLIED TO REVERSE THE DISTRICT 
JUDGE’S DECISION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. 
Additionally, since the original appellate brief was filed in this case, the case of Nettleton 
v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, No. 44416, 2017 WL 6521897, at *4 (Idaho Dec. 21, 2017)(not 
                                                 
45 T. at 16:9-17:-3. 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 35 
released for publication in the permanent law reports) was decided.  There, this Court recently 
considered summary judgment in favor of the employee seeking commission wages and reversed 
and remanded because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding a course of 
performance or dealing that may have modified the written agreement: 
As a preliminary matter, our statutes indicate that, if anything, the 
Snake River Dental contract should be characterized as a “course 
of performance” because the conduct in dispute occurred after or 
under the agreement. See, e.g., I.C. § 28-1-303(a), (b) (Uniform 
Commercial Code provisions distinguishing course of performance 
and course of dealing). Regardless of the characterization, 
however, a course of performance or dealing is generally 
established through a pattern of conduct between the parties such 
as repeated occasions of performance or previous transactions.  Id.; 
see also Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 
156 Idaho 709, 721, 330 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2014). Thus, it does not 
follow that the Snake River Dental contract alone can be used as 
dispositive proof of Nettleton's entitlement to 
the commission wages. 
Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, No. 44416, 2017 WL 6521897, at *4 (Idaho Dec. 21, 
2017)(Not released for publication in the Permanent Law Reports) 
The original Complaint included similar language to those facts cited as creating a 
material issue of fact in Nettleton that the commission was not paid on the date that it was due 
because of the “pattern and practice and course of performance between Scandit and Savage.”46  
It was error for the district judge not to credit this language and instead rely entirely upon the 
language of the CCP and to dismiss the Complaint. 
                                                 
46 R. at 98-99 (at para. 30.b). 
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF - 36 
Savage submits that this issue was subsumed within the issues stated on appeal, including 
the general issue of “whether the District Court erred in determining under a motion to dismiss 
standard that the amount Savage claimed due and owing as a Commission was not wages . . . .”47  
The issue of conversations with Scandit’s employee was also raised in the section of the brief on 
the motion to amend.48  Further, “course of performance” can be used to show a modification as 
a waiver of a contractual condition, and waiver was argued here.  Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Trout 
Farms, Inc., 104 Idaho 284, 658 P.2d 955 (1983) (quoting I.C. § 28-2-208). 
But even if this issue is not before the Court on appeal, prior to the announcement of 
Nettleton, the Nettleton decision does announce a new rule in that it is the first Idaho case to 
apply a course of performance pattern of conduct analysis to vary a written compensation 
agreement regarding payment of wages, including a commission.  And that decision found that 
the course of performance created a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment despite 
the express language of the compensation agreement.  Obviously, the District Judge did not have 
the advantage of this guidance to apply to the allegations of the Complaint, nor did Savage have 
the benefit of the case to list the issues on appeal.  Nettleton should be applied to this case as this 
case was pending on appeal when that rule was announced.  Gay v. Cty. Comm'rs of Bonneville 
Cty., 103 Idaho 626, 630, 651 P.2d 560, 564 (Ct. App. 1982) (using modified prospectivity, the 
“pipeline approach,” to effect of change in rule of law and applying new rule to similar cases in 
the appellate system “pipeline” when the new rule of law was announced). 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., R. at 164 and Opening Brief at pp. 7-10. 
48 Opening Brief at p. 35. 
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F. ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL 
If Savage prevails on this appeal, based on Idaho Code Section 45-615(2), “[a]ny 
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction for the plaintiff in a suit filed pursuant to 
this section may include all costs and attorney's fees reasonably incurred in connection with the 
proceedings.”  Contrary to Scandit’s argument, there is not a requirement that be the “final” 
judgment in this case.  The statute simply says in any “judgment  . . . for the plaintiff.”  The 
Idaho Appellate Rules provide for the district court to enter a judgment for such costs and fees 
on appeal as instructed by the remittitur:  
(f) Clerk to Insert Costs in Remittitur. The Clerk of the Supreme 
Court shall prepare an itemized statement of costs taxed in the 
Supreme Court and insert the same in the remittitur. If the 
remittitur has been issued before the final determination of costs, 
or any amendment thereto, an itemized statement of costs allowed 
shall be forwarded by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to the 
district court or administrative agency as soon as it is available and 
shall then be added to the judgment or order. The payment of costs 
on appeal shall be enforced in the district court or administrative 
agency. 
I.A.R. 40(f) (see also I.A.R. 41(d)).  If the Court disagrees with this analysis, the Court should at 
the very least indicate that if Savage ultimately receives final judgment in her favor on this case, 
she would be entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, including the attorneys’ fees incurred on 
this appeal.  
On the other hand, if this Court finds persuasive the position advanced by Scandit, 
attorneys’ fees on the basis of Idaho Code § 12-121 are not appropriate.  Scandit’s primary 
argument for this is that “the law in Idaho is well settled that an employee has no claim for 
‘wages’ unless and until the alleged wages are ‘earned’ under the terms of the employment 
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agreement.”  Scandit’s interpretation ignores the plain language of the statute in terms of “due,” 
and the definition of “wages” as including a commission. Also, no prior Idaho case has applied 
the condition precedent forfeiture analysis to commission claims as wage claims.  These are but a 
few of the novel issues that were raised in this case in good faith.  If this Court makes such a 
pronouncement in this case in the context of commissions, it will be the first time that these 
points are clarified under Idaho law.  Savage respectfully submits that she has made substantial 
and compelling arguments to the contrary and an award of attorneys’ fees under the standard of 
frivolousness as set forth in Idaho Code § 12-121 would be wholly inappropriate, and what’s 
more would serve to chill the progression of the Wage Claim Act law and the Court 
interpretation of the same.  It would have the effect of discouraging employees, who usually lack 
the resources of the employers and their ever-changing contractual language, to challenge 
whatever the employers may wish to impose. 
A final argument against the imposition of fees under Section 12-121 is that under the 
new language enacted last year, the judge must find that “the case” was “brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  This appears to mean the entire 
case, not just one aspect of the case.  Accord  Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., No. 
44612, 2017 WL 6568768, at *8 (Idaho Dec. 26, 2017) (“[a]ttorney fees are not appropriate 
under I.C. Section 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54 unless all claims brought . . . are frivolous and without 
foundation.”) (opinion not released for publication) (citation omitted).  Scandit has offered no 
argument that the claim with respect to the Achievement Bonus was frivolous and thus has not 
argued “the case” in its entirety is frivolous. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For each of the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in Savage's Opening Brief, the 
District Court's orders granting Scandit's Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend Complaint should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings and the Court 
should award Plaintiff her reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this appeal. 
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